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OUR FEDERALISM, OUR HAZARDOUS WASTE, AND OUR
GOOD FORTUNE
AnAM BABIcH*
Fate, the saying goes, looks after fools, drunkards, and the United
States. One manifestation of this phenomenon is the evolution of
"Our Federalism"' from a vague limitation on the reach of national
power into a promising tool for enforcing environmental laws against
some of this country's most persistent polluters: federal agencies and
state and local governments.2
* Adam Babich, J.D., 1983, Yale Law School, is Editor in Chief of ELR-The Environ-
mental Law Reporter and Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center. ELR
is published by the Environmental Law Institute, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public-interest
organization dedicated to improving environmental law through research, dialogue, and
education. In private practice from 1988-92, Babich represented citizen groups, munici-
palities, and members of the regulated community on environmental issues. Before that,
he litigated hazardous waste cases for the Colorado Department of Law and clerked for
Justice Jean E. Dubofsky of the Colorado Supreme Court.
1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) ("It should never be forgotten that this
slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies
a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.").
2. This Article focuses primarily on environmental cooperative federalism. In addi-
tion to its uses in the field of environmental protection, however, federalism serves several
important purposes:
Four principal values.., support preservation of the federal system. A dual sys-
tem of government checks abuses of power in any branch of the system. State
and local governments increase the opportunities for citizens to participate ac-
tively in the democratic process and create diverse cultural and political environ-
ments. Finally, the distribution of power among fifty-one different governments
enhances opportunities for innovation and experimentation.
Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 10 (1988).
Most of the "checks" on federal power referred to above, however, do not actually
limit that power, but probably do encourage restraint.
[S]tate and local governments check federal authority by regulating areas
that the federal government chooses to ignore. ....
Most importantly, states check national power by serving as a wellspring of
political force. Political parties that are out of power on the federal level can
maintain their constituencies in the states. When the time comes to challenge
the dominant national party, these challengers gather strength from their state
organizations. At the same time, individuals representing new interests can or-
ganize more easily on the state level, building lobbies that may someday be power-
ful enough to sway national politics. In these ways, state governments help
maintain the multiparty system and prevent the growth of a monolithic political
power on the federal level.
Id. at 5-7 (footnotes omitted).
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If asked to design an ideal system of government, few people's
first impulse would be to create a big sovereign whose jurisdiction
overlapped that of many little sovereigns.' Even those sold on the
checks and balances created by separating the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government might balk at establishing over
fifty such three-part structures to govern one nation.4 But like much
of the Constitution, modem federalism can function in ways that ap-
pear to reflect subtle genius. Given the apparent frustration of the
framers' original hopes for the doctrine, however, federalism's contin-
uing vitality must be chalked up largely to good fortune.5
This Article focuses primarily on federalism's impact on govern-
ment programs that regulate hazardous-waste management and
cleanup. First, it provides background discussions of the problems
posed by hazardous waste6 and of federalism's origins. It next ad-
dresses environmental cooperative federalism, discussing five princi-
ples of cooperative federalism in the context of two laws that follow
3. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 908 (1994) ("We have a federal system because we began with a
federal system .... We began with a federal system because of some now uninteresting
details of eighteenth century British colonial administration.... and we proclaim its vir-
tues out of the universal desire for selfjustification.").
4. There are, of course, more sovereigns than 50, since many Indian tribes have re-
tained their sovereignty. See generally David F. Coursen, Tribes as States: Indian Tribal Author-
ity to Regulate and Enforce Federal Environmental Laws and Regulations, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,579 (Oct. 1993) (describing the treatment of Indian lands under environmen-
tal statutes). Generally, when "Congress clearly indicates that Indian tribes are subject to a
given law, no tribal sovereignty exists to bar the reach or enforcement of that law." Blue
Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian AfFairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989). States,
however, do not have jurisdiction "over Indians [on] Indian [lands] unless Congress has
clearly expressed an intention to permit it." Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d
1465, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) does not authorize states to regulate Indians on Indian lands, but expressing no
opinion about whether a state could create a RCRA program regulating non-Indians on
Indian lands). This Article, however, will focus on issues involving the federal govern-
ment's relationship with states, rather than tribes.
5. See THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM OF THE DoMESTIc POLICY COUNCIL, THE
STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA 2 (1986) [hereinafter RACAN WORKNG GROUP REPORT]
(decrying that "the Framers' vision of a limited national government of enumerated pow-
ers has gradually given way to a national government with virtually unlimited power to
direct the public policy choices of the States in almost any area").
6. The term "hazardous waste" is commonly used in three ways: (1) as a catch-all
phrase encompassing the various substances subject to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993); (2) to refer to materials that meet the regulatory
definition of hazardous waste applicable to RCRA's Subtide C regulatory program (codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 261 (1994)); and (3) to refer to materials that meet RCRA's statutory
definition of hazardous waste. 40 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
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very different approaches to the federal/state partnership: The Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(Superfund) 7 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).8 The Article highlights some of the failures of cooperative
federalism in the hazardous waste field. It concludes, however, that
the doctrine earns its keep by providing a potentially effective struc-
ture for enforcing hazardous-waste laws against government-owned or
operated facilities.
I. OUR HAZARDOUS WASTE
A. Regulation and Cleanup
Hazardous waste is a powerful symbol of the need for environ-
mental protection. Disasters like those at Bhopal9 and Chernobyl," °
and incidents like those at Love Canal'1 and Times Beach' 2 raised
legitimate concerns about public exposure to invisible poisons. These
concerns, however, have arguably been blown out of proportion as
movies and television programs reinforced a popular conception that
exposure to hazardous waste is one of the worst fates that one might
suffer.13  Important aspects of Superfund and RCRA seem geared
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k.
9. See E. Donald Elliott & E. Michael Thomas, Chemicals, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW 1265 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993). ("In 1984, an accidental release of
methyl isocyanate from a chemical plant owned by Union Carbide near Bhopal, India,
resulted in thousands of injuries and deaths.").
10. See Dan W. Reicher, Nuclear Energy and Weapons, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw, supra note 9, at 905 ("The worst accident in the history of nuclear power at the
Chernobyl reactor in the Soviet Union ... spread large quantities of radiation over the
Ukraine, Byelorussian and Russian Republics, and westward into Europe.").
11. See Elliott & Thomas, supra note 9, at 1265 (the federal government purchased
homes and evacuated the area because of seepage of toxic chemicals at the Love Canal
disposal site in upstate New York).
12. See Wayne Biddle, Toxic Chemicals Imperil Flooded Town in Missouri, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1982, at A17 (describing dioxin contamination at Times Beach, Missouri).
13. The reality, of course, is much more complicated. Most people are routinely ex-
posed to potentially toxic and carcinogenic substances as they gas up their cars, clean their
houses, refinish their furniture, and engage in countless other day-to-day activities. Be-
cause sciences such as toxicology and epidemiology are still in relatively early stages of
development, the significance to public health of many of these low-level exposures is un-
known. Although scientists regularly conduct risk assessments and provide precise-sound-
ing risk quantifications, such as "5 x 10-4," they base these assessments on assumptions that
are rooted as much in policy decisions as in science. See PAUL A. LocKE, ENVrL. L. INST.,
RES. BlUEr No. 4, REORIENTING RISK ASSEsSMENT 7-8 (1994). Indeed, scientific uncertainty
about these issues is so profound that nobody really knows whether typical risk assessments
tend to over or understate risk. See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic
Risk Assessment, 5 YALEJ. ON REG. 89, 91-92 (1988).
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more to responding to these popular fears than reducing actual
risks. 4
For lawyers, "hazardous waste" and "hazardous substances" are
terms of art that say more about the legal status of chemicals than
about the dangers those chemicals present. Under RCRA, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) imposes stringent and ex-
pensive regulation on management of subtitle C hazardous wastes. 15
But, for seemingly arbitrary reasons, 6 EPA exempts equally danger-
ous chemicals from the system and regulates others hardly at all.' 7
14. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Indeed, several years ago EPA an-
nounced that its spending on hazardous waste problems is disproportionate to other
known risks (such as those posed by air pollution, ozone depletion, and pesticide residues
in food), due in part to the pressure of public opinion. U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS-OVER-
VIEW REPORT XV, 95, 96 (Feb. 1987); see also STEVEN BREVER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE
49 (1993) (noting that "[r]egulatory bodies ... are politically responsive institutions ....
Their agendas, within limits, respond to the public's demands. Their choices of default
assumptions, to a degree, can respond to [various constituents' desires] to appear espe-
cially careful to err on the safe side or alternatively to show sensitivity to economic costs").
15. 40 C.F.R. pt. 261 (1994).
16. For example, the same chemical that is defined as hazardous waste if trucked to a
municipal treatment plant, will be exempt if disposed of at the same treatment plant via a
sewer system that also carries domestic sewage. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a) (1) (ii); see EPA Admin-
istered Permit Programs; the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; General
Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Sources; Regulations to Enhance Control
of Toxic Pollutant and Hazardous Waste Discharges to Publicly Owned Treatment Works
[POTWs], 55 Fed. Reg. 30,082, 30,082 (1990) (pmbl.) ("The exclusion ... covers indus-
trial wastes discharged to POTW sewers containing domestic sewage, even if these wastes
would be considered hazardous if disposed of by other means."); Comite Pro Rescate de la
Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 888 F.2d 180, 188 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied
494 U.S. 1029 (1990). Industrial users of public treatment plants, however, must provide
regulators with notice of wastes sent to the plants that would have been hazardous wastes
"if otherwise disposed of." 40 C.F.R. § 403 .12(p)(1). Similarly, a chemical that is defined
as hazardous waste when it is a discarded commercial product might not meet the defini-
tion if produced as a byproduct of an industrial process. 40 C.F.R. § 261.33(d) (cmt.); see
RiCHARD C. FORTUNA & DAVID J. LENNETr, HAzARDous WASTE REGULATION: THE NEW ERA
32-35 (1986).
17. For example, EPA has noted:
RCRA's implementing regulations for the management of hazardous wastes do
not apply to hazardous wastes derived from households. It has been shown, nev-
ertheless, that even the small quantities of hazardous waste discarded or dis-
charged from households can collectively be of sufficient toxicity and volume in
municipal landfills and sewers to pose serious hazards to human health and the
environment.
EPA recognizes that a variety of common household commodities contain
toxic pollutants, including acids, bases, metals, and complex organic compounds,
including aliphatic and aromatic hydrocarbons, and chlorinated organic solvents.
U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 21W-4004, NATIONAL PRETREATMENT PROGRAM:
REPORT TO CONGRESS, 3-53 (1991) [hereinafter EPA PRETREATMENT REPORT]. Indeed, EPA
has acknowledged that, although municipal solid waste landfills (MSWLFs) are much less
1995] 1519
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
This regime may allow government representatives to tell the public
that hazardous wastes are carefully regulated, but only because Con-
gress and EPA have defined the term "hazardous waste" to exclude
many potentially dangerous materials.
Although broader and more flexible than RCRA subtitle C, the
Superfund program for cleanup of "hazardous substances""' is now
notorious for fostering too much litigation and too little actual
cleanup.19 Superfund's dramatic success in addressing imminent
hazards2" has been overshadowed by misguided attempts to restore
stringently regulated than most hazardous waste facilities, "data available to [EPA] .. . do
not provide strong support for distinguishing the health and environmental threats posed
by MSWLFs and Subtitle C facilities." Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg.
50,978, 50,982 (Oct. 9, 1991) (pmbl.) [hereinafter Solid Waste Preamble].
Solid waste (i.e., garbage, which is not regulated by RCRA Subtitle C) is often indistin-
guishable from subtitle C hazardous waste unless you know where the wastes came from.
Solid waste can contain lead and other heavy metals, solvents, pesticides, radioactive mater-
ials, and other substances that easily qualify as toxic. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a), (b)
(exempting certain mining wastes, pulping liquors, spent sulfuric acid, spent wood preserv-
ing solutions, household waste, waste from coal combustion, wastes associated with oil ex-
ploration, development, or production, cement kiln dust waste, etc.). See generalyJohn C.
Dembach, Industrial Waste: Saving the Worst for Last?, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,283 (July 1990). Superfund's definition of "hazardous substances" picks up some but
not all material that is exempt from RCRA Subtitle C. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14) (defining the term). Superfund authorizes the government
to take action, inter alia, "[w]henever any hazardous substance is released or there is a
substantial threat of such a release into the environment." Id. § 9604(a) (1). The govern-
ment determines the nature of its response on a site-by-site basis. See infra note 82 and
accompanying text.
19. SeeJAMES M. MCELFISH, JR. &JOHN PENDERGRASS, REAUTHORIZING SUPERFUND: LES-
SONS FROM THE STATES, ENVTL. L. INST., RES. BRIEF No. 2, 3-4 (1993) (summarizing com-
plaints about the Superfund program). But the authors of a Brookings Institution and
Resources for the Future study recently noted:
[D]espite a great deal of rhetoric to the contrary, the cleanup of the 1,134
nonfederal sites currently on EPA's National Priorities List will not impose an
overwhelmingly large financial burden on many industries ....
[T] he current Superfund program pales in comparison to other federal envi-
ronmental regulatory programs in terms of annual economic impact. According
to our estimates, annual spending in the United States pursuant to Superfund is
about $6 billion, including expenditures by all parts of the federal government
and all spending by private parties for cleanup, Superfund taxes, and transaction
costs. This $6 billion represents less than 5 percent of the $135 billion spent in
the United States each year to comply with all federal environmental regulations.
KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL., FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: WHO PAYS AND
How? 9-11 (1995).
20. For example, drum farms-like the one that exploded in Elizabeth, New Jersey in
1980 and threatened the population of New York City-are no longer quite such a com-
mon sight. See 25 Years of Headlines, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 56, 58. J. William Futrell
has argued that Superfund's "emergency response program is one of the great environ-
mental achievements of the last decade" and that "Superfund launched and continues to
further a revolution in corporate board rooms" leading to pollution prevention and waste
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contaminated sites to almost pristine conditions.21 Meanwhile, other
sites-which present dangers that are not immediate enough to qual-
ify for "removal action"22 and score too low on EPA's hazard ranking
system for "remedial action"2 3-receive essentially no federal atten-
tion under Superfund, even if they pose risks in excess of the Agency's
21
"acceptable" range.
The result under both RCRA and Superfund, is that society
spends a disproportionate amount of resources addressing a relatively
limited selection of the risks posed by toxic materials. 25 Despite these
minimization. J. William Futrell, Superfund and Reactionary Rhetoric, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb.
1994, at 56.
21. Under Superfund,
[Tihe EPA reacted to unrealistic congressional goals by spending huge amounts
of money while attempting to meet cleanup standards that varied inexplicably
from site to site. Apparently accepting the congressional assumption that current
technology was adequate to the job, the EPA mandated expensive application of
unproven groundwater-cleanup techniques to contaminated sites across the na-
tion. Despite the essentially experimental nature of this undertaking, the agency
failed to require the careful review and documentation that would have been part
of a conscious effort to advance cleanup technology. As a result-aside from the
under-heralded "removal" program, under which the EPA takes quick action to
abate immediate risks-the EPA spent so much for so little under Superfund that,
by 1994, the program threatened the credibility of the entire environmental
movement.
Adam Babich, What Next?, ENvTm. F., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 48, 50.
22. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.415 (setting forth the factors to consider in determining
whether a removal action under the National Contingency Plan (NCP)-the regulations
that implement Superfund-is appropriate). Removal actions generally address relatively
immediate risks. Id.
23. Remedial actions are designed to provide long-term protection. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(24). To be eligible for federally financed remedial action, a site must be listed on
EPA's National Priorities List (NPL). 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b) (1). EPA may list a site on the
NPL if it scores sufficiently high on EPA's Hazard Ranking System. Id. § 300(c) (1).
24. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e) (2) (i) (A) (2) ("For known or suspected carcinogens, ac-
ceptable exposure levels are generally concentration levels that represent an excess upper
bound lifetime cancer risk to an individual of between 10-4 and 10-6.. ."); National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, Final Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666,
8715-18 (1990) (pmbl.) (describing EPA's acceptable risk range); see also Ohio v. EPA, 997
F.2d 1520, 1533-34 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding and explaining EPA's risk range).
25. RCRA regulates Subtitle C hazardous wastes with a stringency that might be imprac-
tical if the program applied more equally to all dangerous waste. See Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curium), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 849 (1990) (noting that RCRA allows EPA to require treatment of Subtitle C
hazardous waste to levels below drinking water standards because although "EPA must con-
sider costs in setting [drinking water standards] there is no similar limitation in § 3004 of
RCRA").
E. Donald Elliott has noted:
[T] he true price for the misallocation of our scarce environmental resources is
paid not only in dollars but also in other environmental problems left unad-
dressed .... [O]ur effort is "an inch wide and a mile deep"-focusing on rela-
tively few substances that we regulate very heavily ....
1995] 1521
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
problems, however, both statutes have dramatically improved environ-
mental protection. 6
A. Governmental Polluters
The most dangerous hazardous waste sites in the United States
generally are those that the federal government created itself.27 Dur-
ing the Manhattan Project and the cold war that followed, the federal
government and its various contractors built a vast infrastructure
across the United States for manufacture and storage of nuclear and
chemical weapons.2 8 This weapons production "came at a price that
few.., could have anticipated": pervasive environmental contamina-
tion.29 Some sites continue to pose risks of explosion and nuclear
E. Donald Elliott, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program that Works!, 92
MICH. L REv. 1840, 1847 (1994) (book review); see also Babich, supra note 21, at 54 ("Re-
gardless of whether disparate treatment of similar risks is the result of political influence or
simple inertia, it is wasteful, destructive, and-ultimately--threatens the credibility of the
environmental regulatory system.").
26. See David Chittick, Soundbite, ENvrL. F., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 51 ("It's difficult to un-
derstand how far we have come unless we look back 20 or 30 years.... Chemicals of all
types were put into the ground... without any knowledge as to the long-term effects.").
Superfund and RCRA have been particularly successful in terms of the incentives they
create for waste minimization and voluntary cleanup. See Adam Babich, Understanding the
New Era in Environmental Law, 41 S.C. L. REv. 733, 755-58 (1990). Additionally, they allow
the government to respond quickly to situations that pose risks to public health or the
environment, such as toxic materials stored in poorly maintained lagoons or drum farms.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6973; id. § 9606.
27. See Colorado v. United States Dep't of Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D. Colo.
1989) (calling the Defense Department's Rocky Mountain Arsenal "the worst hazardous
and toxic waste site in America"); COUNCIL ON THE DEP'T OF ENERGY'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS
COMPLEX, TIDES FOUND., FACING REALITY. NUCLEAR WEAPONS "CLEANUP" 3 (1995) [herein-
after FACING REALITY] ("In terms of the quantity and virulence of its wastes, the [U.S. De-
partment of Energy (DOE)] legacy is in a class of its own . . .").
28. See OFFICE OF ENVTL. MGT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, CLOSING THE CIRCLE ON THE
SPLITTING OF THE ATOM 2 (1995) [hereinafter CLOSING THE CIRCLE] ("Some idea of the
scale of this [nuclear weapons production] enterprise can be understood from the cost
from the Manhattan Project to the present, the United States spent over 300 billion dollars
on nuclear weapons . . . ."); RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 601-05
(1986) (describing the scope of the Manhattan Project); Vicky L. Peters et al., Can States
Enforce RCRA at Superfund Sites? The Rocky Mountain Arsenal Decision, 23 Envd. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,419, 10,419 (July 1993) ("The Army used the 27 square mile [Rocky
Mountain Arsenal] site to make chemical and incendiary weapons, including mustard gas,
white phosphorous, phosgene, and napalm."); Dan W. Reicher &Jason Salzman, One Hun-
dred Billion Dollars and Counting.... ENVTL. F.,Jan./Feb. 1989, at 15, 16 ("DOE's 17 major
nuclear weapons research and production facilities are located in 13 states, employ about
90,000 people, and occupy an area twice the size of Delaware.").
29. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, COMPLEX CLEANUP, THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION (1991). Indeed:
The past 45 years of nuclear weapons production have resulted in the release of
vast quantities of hazardous chemicals and radionuclides to the environment.
There is evidence that air, groundwater, surface water, sediments, and soil, as well
1522 [VOL. 54:1516
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chain reaction.3 °  The government exacerbated many of these
problems throughout much of the 1980s by engaging in "[c]rude
waste disposal practices that were banned in the private sector."3"
as vegetation and wildlife, have been contaminated at most, if not all, of the De-
partment of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons sites.
Id. at 3; see also 1 OFCE OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, U.S. DFP'T OF ENERGY, ESTIMATING THE
CoL WAR MORTGAGE: THE 1995 BASELjNE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT REPORT iii
(1995) ("In addition to creating an arsenal of nuclear weapons, the [nuclear weapons]
complex left an unprecedented environmental legacy.... [including] an enormous back-
log of waste and dangerous materials."). DOE has stated that:
problems posed by [the nuclear weapons complex] are unlike those associated
with any other industry. They include unique radiation hazards, unprecedented
volumes of contaminated water and soil, and a vast number of contaminated
structures ranging from reactors to chemical plants... to evaporation ponds.
... The imperatives of the nuclear arms race... demanded that weapons
production and testing, rather than waste management and the control of envi-
ronmental contamination, be given the first priority.
CLOSING THE CIRCLE, supra note 28, at 4-5. See also Survey Finds DOE Plutonium Storage to Pose
Risks to Environment, Workers, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1618 (Dec. 16, 1994) ("The Energy De-
partment's inventory of plutonium presents significant hazards to workers, the public, and
environment, according to the conclusions of a draft survey of DOE facilities"); DOE says
Weapons Plant Cleanups to Cost $230 Billion, Take 75 Years, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Apr. 4,
1995, at A-7 (reporting that DOE believes that it will take a minimum of $170 billion to
take "minimum action" to stabilize nuclear weapons sites). According to the U.S. General
Accounting Office, DOE faces the need to spend "perhaps as much as $1 trillion" on clean-
ing up contamination at over 7000 sites. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-
95-1, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL PRIORITIES
NEEDED FOR MEETING ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 10 (1995) [hereinafter GAO PRIORITIES
REPORT].
30. ADVISORY COMM. ON NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, FINAL
REPORT ON DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 72-89, 152 (1991) (describing risk of explosion in
radioactive-waste tanks at the DOE Hanford and Savannah River facilities and "nuclear
criticality concerns" posed by plutonium in ducts at the Rocky Flats Plant); FACING REALITY,
supra note 27, at 5 (listing examples of radioactive waste and contamination problems at
nuclear weapons production sites); see, e.g., Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Andrus, 825 F.
Supp. 1483, 1507 (D. Idaho 1993) ("The Office of Nuclear Safety... expressed significant
concerns over the Underwater Fuel Storage Basin at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
In particular, the Office noted that conditions at that facility have degraded to such an
extent that 'the potential for a criticality accident has increased significantly.'") (citation
omitted); Danger of Explosion at Hanford Concealed, DOE Still Understates Problem, Report Says,
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 657 (Aug. 3, 1990) ("A DOE report . .acknowledged the risk of an
explosion of more than a hundred tanks holding millions of gallons of highly radioactive
sludge... left over from more than 40 years of nuclear weapons production."); Radioactive
Waste Tanks at Hanford Seriously Deteriorating DOE Reports, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2836 (Feb.
26, 1993) (Tanks containing millions of gallons of radioactive waste at DOE Hanford Res-
ervation may be leaking radioactive and chemical waste into soil and ground water. More-
over, a buildup of hydrogen makes some of the tanks vulnerable to explosion).
31. Matthew L. Wald, Waste Dumping that U.S. Banned Went on at Its Oum Atom Plants,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1988, at AI; seeAdam Babich, DOE's Promising First Step, ENrL. F., May/
June 1995, at 10 (reviewing CLOSING THE CIRCLE, supra note 28, and summarizing DOE's
compliance history).
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States and their political subdivisions are also significant pol-
luters, although their contribution to pollution problems is not as well
documented as that of federal agencies.32 One significant problem is
that RCRA and the Clean Water Act, working together, have the per-
verse effect of transforming toxic waste generated by private facilities
into toxic discharges from municipal sewage treatment plants. 3 This
is because EPA exempts the discharge of industrial waste through sew-
ers to municipal treatment plants from regulation under both RCRA
and the Clean Water Act's National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES).4 These exemptions reduce the role of federal and
state enforcement agencies, leaving the municipal operators of sewage
treatment plants responsible for regulating industrial discharges of
hazardous materials to municipal plants.3" The system tends to break
32. States and municipalities, of course, engage in many of the same activities as private
businesses. For example, many maintain fleets of vehicles, own and operate real property
and storage tanks, and manage construction and demolition projects. States and local
governments maintain streets and highways, hospitals, universities, airports, and other fa-
cilities that generate toxic materials. See, e.g., TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, REP. No. 351, HAZARDOUS WASTES IN HIGHWAY RIGHTS-OF-WAY 26-33
(1993) (noting various hazardous waste problems that state transportation departments
face). Moreover, various states have
expressed the view, to some degree, that their [transportation department] em-
ployees had first acted as though, or assumed that, the fact of being a public
agency and "sister" agency to the state environmental regulatory agency... would
grant them some immunity from the environmental requirements applied to the
private sector. Maintenance departments were quite often the first to be disa-
bused of this notion when state regulatory agencies appeared at maintenance fa-
cilities to inspect underground storage tanks and the handling of hazardous
materials at the facilities.
Id. at 26; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBUC ADMINISTRATION, SETTING PRIORITIES, GET-
TING RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR EPA (Summary Report to Congress) 32 (1995) [here-
inafter NAPA REPORT] (noting that often "local governments are a source of pollution, like
industry; they operate sewage systems, landfills, incinerators, and other facilities that
pollute").
33. See EPA PRETREATMENT REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-3 (municipal treatment plants
must impose controls on businesses that discharge to sewers "to protect receiving water
[and] also to ensure that sewage sludge is of sufficient quality for the disposal or beneficial
use intended. Sewage sludge may be landfilled or incinerated, or, if it contains low
enough quantities of toxic pollutants, it may be used as a fertilizer or soil conditioner.").
34. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(1)(ii) (RCRA exemption); 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(c) (NPDES ex-
emption). The NPDES system is governed by 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Because of these
exemptions
wastewater from POTWs [publicly owned treatment works] consists of domestic
sewage and industrial and commercial wastes that are discharged indirectly to
surface waters via sewers by industrial users of the POTWs. There are hundreds of
thousands of [such] industrial users in the United States. Approximately 30,000 indus-
trial users meet EPA's definition of "significant industrial user."
EPA PRETREATMENT REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 403.8 (requiring pretreatment programs); see U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, INDUSTRIAL USER PERMI-TING GUIDANCE MANUAL 1-3, 1-4 (1989) (publicly owned
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down, largely because it is unrealistic to expect municipalities to en-
force federal mandates aggressively against companies that make up a
good part of the municipalities' tax and employment bases.3 6 Indus-
trial pollutants that pass through or interfere with municipal facili-
ties,3 7 however, can cause municipalities to violate their NPDES
permits.38  Moreover, the system can also result in releases from mu-
nicipal plants of pollutants that EPA-or state permitting authori-
ties-failed to anticipate when writing municipalities' NPDES
permits.3 9
Governmental sources of pollution-whether federal, state, or lo-
cal-are generally more difficult to control than their privately owned
analogues. This is because, by and large, environmental laws depend
treatment works "with approved pretreatment programs are required to issue industrial
user permits or other authorized control mechanisms to their industrial users"); EPA PRE-
TREATMENT REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-6 ("Local governments bear the primary responsi-
bility for developing, carrying out, and enforcing local pretreatment programs."). In turn,
the municipal plants generally discharge the waste to surface water and, thus, are governed
by NPDES permits. 42 U.S.C. § 1311(a); EPA PRETREATMENT REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-2
(noting that each municipal treatment plant "that discharges directly to surface waters
must apply for and obtain an NPDES permit"); id. at 1-4 (noting that such "NPDES permits
... protect two media: receiving waters and sewage sludges").
36. EPA has found that "significant deficiencies in program implementation by [mu-
nicipal treatment plants] are apparent, such as issuing inadequate permits ... and failing
to take effective enforcement actions." EPA PRETREATMENT REPORT, supra note 17, at 7-55.
EPA studied three cities' pretreatment programs in about 1983. The study found that all
three cities' "programs were deficient in... identification of industries, monitoring, per-
mitting, and enforcement; this resulted in NPDES permit violations and documented envi-
ronmental problems." Id. at 1-19. According to EPA, each major study that has been
submitted to Congress about the pretreatment program has found that "improved enforce-
ment" may be needed to meet environmental goals. Id. at 1-24; see also Arnold W. Reitze,
Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worked; What's Failed; What Might Work, 21
ENvrL. L. 1549, 1570 (1991) (noting that local governments rarely "use their legal powers
to protect the environment").
37. As EPA has stated:
Typically, [municipal treatment plants] receive a mixture of two types of waste:
domestic sewage.., and industrial wastewaters discharged into the sewer. Indus-
trial wastes frequently contain toxic pollutants, such as heavy metals or manmade
organic chemicals, that may not be compatible with the physical and biological
processes that [such plants] typically use to treat wastes. Such toxic pollutants
may pass through wastewater treatment plants untreated or interfere with treat-
ment plant operations. Therefore, [treatment plants] may require industrial
users to "pretreat" wastewaters discharged to municipal sewers.
EPA PRETREATMENT REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-4.
38. See supra note 35.
39. EPA has noted that "[flew [municipal treatment plant] NPDES permits contain
limits for toxic pollutants." EPA PRETREATMENT REPORT, supra note 17, at 5-78. Addition-
ally, the Second Circuit has held that a regulated entity may discharge pollutants with
impunity if its NPDES permit fails to address them. Atlantic States Legal Found. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 62 (1994).
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on effective enforcement to inspire compliance efforts. Unless the
laws are enforced, the natural tendency of any regulated party is to
put its resources into achieving its primary mission, whether that mis-
sion is to manufacture a product or to provide a governmental service
such as police protection or national security.4" By virtue of its sover-
eign status, the federal government has developed a number of subtle
and not-so-subtle ways to stave off enforcement actions.41 In contrast,
states and local governments are clearly vulnerable to federal enforce-
ment. Nonetheless, enforcement actions against these entities can be
politically sensitive.42
II. OUR FEDERALISM
The Supreme Court has used the phrase "Our Federalism" to re-
fer to "a proper respect for state functions ... [and a] belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways."4" The Court stressed:
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States'
Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over
every important issue in our National Government and its
courts .... What the concept does represent is a system in
40. For example, in CLOSING THE CIRCLE, supra note 28, at 4-5, DOE asserts that the
imperatives of the Cold War demanded that weapons production and testing be given
priority over control of environmental contamination. Indeed, "[flor more than 50 years,
DOE and its predecessors focused on producing nuclear weapons, giving relatively low
priority to managing waste, whether hazardous (toxic) or radioactive or both (mixed
waste)." GAO PRIORITIES REPORT, supra note 29, at 11. To placate regulators and, thus,
"stay in [weapons] production," DOE signed "unrealistic cleanup agreements at several
sites," assuming that it could later revise impractical deadlines. Id. at 27-30. The resulting
"[d]elays in meeting these commitments led regulators to... doubt DOE's credibility." Id.
at 3.
41. When introducing a conference report regarding Superfund amendments to the
Senate, one of its principal authors noted: "[N]o loophole, it seems, is too small to be
found by the Federal Government." 132 CONG. REC. S14,903 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (re-
marks of Sen. Stafford). Indeed, in one of its most blatant attempts to shield federal pol-
luters from independent oversight, EPA asserted the right in 1989 to exempt federal
facilities from state enforcement by listing the facilities on the national priorities list. List-
ing Policy for Federal Facilities, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,520 (1989). But in United States v. Colo-
rado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1583 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994), the court
found that EPA's assertion of power to preempt state enforcement authority is "contrary to
the plain language" of Superfund. See Adam Babich Circumventing Environmental Laws:
Does the Sovereign Have a License to Pollute?, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1991 (re-
viewing federal strategies for avoiding enforcement); see also infra notes 116-118 and ac-
companying text (describing the federal government's unitary-executive policy).
42. See Merritt, supra note 2, at 6-7 ("Some state and local governments have proven
themselves formidable lobbyists and indefatigable litigants.").
43. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect fed-
eral rights and federal interest, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly inteifere with the legitimate activities
of the States."
This formulation arguably has been watered-down from the fram-
ers' original intent. Rather than asserting that the national govern-
ment would display "sensitivity" and endeavor not to interfere
"unduly" with the states, James Madison claimed that the powers dele-
gated to the federal government "are few and defined. . . . [T] he
powers reserved to the several States will extend to all objects which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the States."45 Under Madison's interpretation, protec-
tion of public health and welfare would clearly fall within the province
of the states.
Whatever the framers' intent,' the very document they drafted
doomed from the beginning any dream of a national government
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. THE FEDERALIST (James Madison), No. 45, at 292-93 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
id., No. 39, at 245 (asserting that the proposed government's very "jurisdiction extends to
certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty over all other objects"); id. (Alexander Hamilton), No. 31, at 197 ("there is
greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the federal head than by the
federal head upon the members").
These statements, of course, were made in promoting a compromise that greatly ex-
panded the role of the national government, compared with the clear primacy of the states
under the Articles of Confederation. Samuel Adams argued that "the Idea of Sovereignty
in the States must be lost" if the compromise were adopted. Letter from Samuel Adams to
Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE WIUTINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMs 324
(Harry A. Cushing ed., 1908). To allay fears that a national government would spell the
end of state sovereignty, proponents of the Constitution made assurances that the First
Congress would consider a Bill of Rights, including the Tenth Amendment, to explicitly
reserve nondelegated powers to the states or the people. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 124 (1941). See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERic McKrrlucK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM
59.61 (1993). But the Tenth Amendment "is essentially a tautology." New York v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992). There is "nothing in the history of its adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment."
Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
46. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHL L.
REv. 1513, 1526-31 (1987) (book review) ("The founders simply did not agree on which
came first, nation or states, or on the locus of 'sovereignty,' whatever that might be....
They did not agree, in fact, on a great many important questions about federal power and
state autonomy and no amount of reinterpretation or rearrangement of the evidence can
make them do so.") (foomote omitted).
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with sharply limited powers. For one thing, the framers enumerated
federal powers "in language broad enough to allow for the expansion
of the Federal Government's role."4 7 For another, the Constitution's
command that federal law "be the supreme law of the Land"' more
or less predetermined the legal outcome of any power struggle be-
tween the federal government and the states.49 Most importantly, the
framers embedded into the Constitution a great evil-slavery--the
lingering effects of which would require the full breadth of the com-
merce power to battle."
47. NewYork v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2418-19; seeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (authoriz-
ing Congress to, inter alia, "pay the Debts and provide for the . .. general Welfare ...
regulate Commerce... among the several States... [and] make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers").
Complaints like those in the REAGAN WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at 43, that
the Court has altered the framers' design, ultimately ignore the plain language of the
Constitution. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985)
("With rare exceptions. . . the Constitution does not carve out express elements of state
sovereignty that Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace."). In the final
analysis, it is that plain language, not the advocacy documents known as the Federalist Pa-
pers, that should guide the Court's interpretation. See Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment,
as Perceived by Randy Barnet4 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1508, 1509 (1994) (urging traditional analy-
sis of the Constitution's text because "the Constitution is a legal document") (citation
omitted).
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[A]nd all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land. .. ").
49. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2419 ("[T]he Supremacy Clause gives the
Federal Government 'a decided advantage in th[e] delicate balance' the Constitution
strikes between State and Federal power.") (citation omitted).
50. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975). Article IV, § 2 reads:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escap-
ing into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of
the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also art. I, § 9 (prohibiting Congress from ending the African
slave trade before 1808); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (upholding a fugitive
slave law).
It is no accident that some of the Court's most expansive readings of the commerce
power came in the context of federal efforts to battle racism. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that Congress may regulate conduct at a local restau-
rant that serves food which has moved in interstate commerce under the 1964 Civil Rights
Act). Indeed, if the Court had denied the federal government the tools to grapple with the
stain of slavery, it is questionable whether what remained-however consistent in its details
with the framers' intentions-would have been worthy of the bold experiment in democ-
racy that the Constitution represents.
Earlier high points in the Court's expansive reading of the commerce power came in
cases like Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of home-
grown, home-consumed wheat), in response to problems posed by the Depression. In-
deed, Bruce Ackerman argues that it was only after the New Deal that "the federal govern-
ment would operate as a truly national government, speaking for the People on all matters
that sufficiently attracted the interest of lawmakers in Washington, D.C." BRUCE AcKIr.s-
MAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105 (1991).
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Yet, while the federal government apparently now has the power
to displace most state regulation, this has not meant the destruction of
state sovereignty.51 As noted by the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority," the "built-in restraints that our
system provides through state participation in federal governmental
action" provide for a continued role for state sovereignty in the fed-
eral system.53 Although it recently supplemented those restraints in
Lopez v. United States,54 to date the Court has left it largely up to Con-
51. Court decisions defining the extent of federal power have "traveled an unsteady
path." New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2420. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), which had held that the Tenth Amendment barred Congress from making federal
minimum wage overtime laws applicable to state and municipal employees. Usery had over-
ruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), which, like Garcia, sustained the validity of
extending federal wage laws to public employees. Dissenting in Garcia, Justice Rehnquist
expressed his confidence that the holding of Usety would "in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court." 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
53. Id. at 528, 550, 556. The Court noted that each state is equally represented in the
Senate and plays a role in selecting the President and members of the legislative branch.
The Court explained that: "Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the
delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the Framers
to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal
Government itself." Id. at 550-51.
54. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). In Lopez, the Court held unconstitutional the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is
a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Court explained
that "the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic actity that
might, through repetition elsewhere, have.., a substantial effect on interstate commerce."
Id. at 1634 (emphasis added).
The Lopez Court identified "three broad categories of activity that Congress may regu-
late under its commerce power," (1) "the channels of interstate commerce," (2) "the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce," and
(3) "activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. at 1629-30. As
recognized byJustice Thomas in his concurrence, however, the third of these categories "if
taken to its logical extreme, would give Congress a 'police power' over all aspects of Ameri-
can life," which is exactly the result a majority of the Court wished to avoid. Id. at 1642
(Thomas, J., concurring).
Reasoning that the Constitution's enumeration of powers must "presuppose some-
thing not enumerated" and that there must be some "distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local," the Court drew a line between "commercial" and "non-
commercial" activity. The Court acknowledged the vagueness of this distinction, admitting
that the question of "whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in
some cases result in legal uncertainty." Id. at 1633. Moreover, the Court's opinion might
be read as suggesting that Congress may regulate "noncommercial" activity under the com-
merce power if it provides for "a case-by-case [factual] inquiry" into "the requisite nexus
[of the violator's conduct] with interstate commerce." Id. at 1631 (citation omitted).
In dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the Court for believing that "the Constitution
would distinguish between two local activities, each of which has an identical effect upon
interstate commerce, if one, but not the other, is 'commercial' in nature." Moreover, Jus-
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tice Breyer pointed out that Congress "could rationally conclude that schools fall on the
commercial side of the line." Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority's most
telling response was that Justice Breyer's analysis would leave one "unable to identify any
activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not." Id. at 1632.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor in concurrence, identified the root of
the problem: "the transition from the economic system the Founders knew to the single,
national market still emergent in our own era." Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy, however, accepted the commercial/noncommercial distinction, stating
that "Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a
single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy." Id. at 1637.
Because the votes of both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were crucial to the result in
Lopez, Kennedy's concurring opinion may prove important to the evolution of the Court's
new view of the commerce power.
Justice Kennedy focused on (1) the fact that "education is a traditional concern of the
States" and (2) the assertion that a federal intrusion into areas of traditional state concern
would interfere with government accountability. If, he claimed, "the Federal Government
[were] to take over the regulation of entire [noncommercial] areas of traditional state
concern ... the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur
and political responsibility would become illusory." Justice Kennedy stressed that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act would have "foreclose[d] the States from experimenting and exer-
cising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and
expertise.., by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and
usual sense of that term." Id. at 1641.
Justice Kennedy's accountability analysis echoes Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2424 (1992). But in New York v. United States
the focus on accountability made sense. That case involved a congressional attempt to
regulate indirectly by "compel [ling] States to regulate." Id. In contrast, Lopez concerned
Congress's straightforward and direct prohibition of conduct it deemed dangerous. The
defendant was charged with a federal crime, indicted by a federal grand jury, and con-
victed in federal court In Lopez, therefore, Congress acted "in full view of the public, and
. . . federal officials [would] suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detri-
mental or unpopular." New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
Perhaps to reassure those who-like Justice Souter-fear "a return to the untenable
jurisprudence from which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago," Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
at 1654 (Souter,J., dissenting) ,Justice Kennedy noted that history "counsels great restraint
before the Court determines that the Clause is insufficient to support an exercise of the
national power." Thus, "stare decisis operates with great force in counseling us not to call in
question the essential principles now in place respecting the congressional power to regu-
late transactions of a commercial nature." Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
How will Lopez affect federal regulation of the environment? It is too soon to tell.
Clearly protection of the public's health and welfare is a traditional state function. Pre-
sumably, therefore, federal intrusion into environmental protection raises "accountability"
concerns for Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. Just as clearly, however, most hazardous
waste management activity is closely tied to commercial activity. But questions remain. For
example, is it within the commerce power for Congress to authorize EPA take action on
private property to protect children from dangerous levels of heavy metals in residential
(or school) soils? See Superfund § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. Will congressional attempts to
'reform" state tort law qualify as "commercial" regulation? See Anthony Lewis, Back to the
Future?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at A33 (noting that "[flederalization of tort law is an
example" of conservative demands for "[f] ederal action in all kinds of areas traditionally
left to the states"); see also Philip H. Corboy, Steamrolling Tort Reform, LEGAL TiMEs, Mar. 27,
1995, at 22 (arguing that "H.R. 956, the so-called Common Sense Product Liability and
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gress to define the respective roles of the federal and state govern-
ments. 55 Thus, federalism and state sovereignty are changeable
concepts. For example, as of this writing, many legislators who, in
other contexts, extol the virtues of state autonomy, have pledged to
federalize the tort law of the several states.5"
III. COOPERATVE FEDERALISM
The "built-in restraints"57 protecting the states' primacy in their
traditional domains are reflected in Congress's practice of pursuing
environmental protection8 -at least under most modem antipollu-
tion laws-through "program[s] of 'cooperative federalism"' which
"offer States the choice of regulating . . . according to federal stan-
dards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation."59 The
Legal Reform Act of 1995, is notable for its complete disregard for principles of federal-
ism"). The Court's decision could also call into question the constitutionality of
Superfund § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 9658, which tolls state statutes of limitations for toxic torts
until "the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the... damages
were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant
concerned."
Certainly the Court has announced a test that will be difficult to apply logically and
consistently over time. Only time will tell whether Lopez will be seen, to quote Justice Sou-
ter's dissent, "as only a misstep, its reasoning and its suggestions not quite in gear with the
prevailing standard." Justice Souter, however, went on to warn: "Not every epochal case
has come in epochal trappings." Lope7, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting).
55. Nonetheless, the federal government cannot "'commandee[r] the legislative
processes of the States.'" New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Thus, Con-
gress "may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."
New York v. United States, 112 S. CL at 2435. In New York v. United States, the Court found
that a law that required states to either regulate according to Congress's directions or take
title to waste generated within their borders "crossed the line distinguishing encourage-
ment from coercion," and that Congress had no authority "to impose either option as a
freestanding requirement". Id. at 2428. Moreover, although the state had initially agreed
to enactment of the statute at issue, state officials "cannot consent to the enlargement of
the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution." Id. at 2432.
56. House Republican Conference, Legislative Digest, Sept. 27, 1994, at 38 (containing
the "Contract with America"); see Corboy, supra note 54.
57. See supra text accompanying note 53.
58. Environmental law "began as a creature of state law [and] continues to have a
strong state focus even after several decades of federal activism and legislation." James M.
McElfish Jr., State Environmental Law and Programs § 6.01 [1], in 1 LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECnON 6-4 (Sheldon M. Novick, Environmental Law Inst. eds., 1994).
59. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2412; see also Mark Squillace, Cooperative
Federalism Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Is This Any Way to Run a
Government?, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,039, 10,039 (Feb. 1985) ("One of the
hallmarks of the environmental legislation passed by Congress in the 1970s was its in-
creased reliance on a regulatory framework that has come to be known as cooperative
federalism.... To varying degrees, virtually all of the major regulatory laws in the environ-
mental field employ this scheme.").
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Supreme Court described Congress's first use of environmental coop-
erative federalism in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 as Con-
gress "taking a stick to the States."60 That stick (the threat of
preemption), however, usually is accompanied by a carrot-federal
funding for qualifying state antipollution programs.61 Although Con-
gress and EPA occasionally have attempted to command that states
develop and implement regulatory programs,62 cooperative federal-
ism, in general, is based on federal incentives for state regulation.6"
Cooperative federalism holds the promise of allowing the states
continued primacy and flexibility in their traditional realms of pro-
tecting public health and welfare, while ensuring that protections for
all citizens meet minimum federal standards. In theory, the system
60. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975) (noting
that Congress acted in frustration over states' disappointing response to federal concerns
about air pollution). Arguably, modern cooperative federalism was not practical before
the late 1960s because
it was unclear whether the federal government could constitutionally operate air
and water pollution programs. The expansion of the commerce clause in support
of the federal regulatory power was a long process and was not completed until
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.... The Supreme Court's vindication of [that Act]
opened the door for sweeping environmental health and safety regulation.
J. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
supra note 9, at 38 (footnote omitted). Tracing the evolution of federal environmental
laws from 1948 until the early 1970s, Futrell argues that Congress "steadily shifted power to
the federal government," resulting in a "creeping federalization" of environmental law. Id.
61. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7405 (authorizing EPA grants for support of air pollution planning
and control programs).
62. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1204-05 (1977). In 1973,
EPA published regulations that purported to require that states adopt statutes and regula-
tions to implement programs to control automobile emissions pursuant to the Clean Air
Act. Three circuit courts issued options overturning the regulations, and one circuit court
issued an opinion upholding them. In EPAv. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per curiam), the
Supreme Court vacated the three decisions adverse to EPA, after the Agency agreed to
modify the regulations. Id. at 1204 n.45.
It is not uncommon for Congress to enact laws that appear to require states to assume
regulatory burdens. See Nicholas J. Johnson, EPCRA's Collision with Federalism, 27 IND. L.
REV. 549 (1994) (asserting that Congress, in the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, issued a flat command that states regulate). But in most or all of these
cases, it is doubtful that the courts would take Congress's language literally as attempts to
commandeer the states' legislative processes. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at
2425 ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious con-
stitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.") (citation omitted).
63. There are "a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may
urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests." For example,
Congress may impose conditions on receipt of federal funds so long as the conditions
"bear some relationship to the purpose" of the spending. New York v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. at 2412.
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allows states to experiment and innovate, but not to sacrifice public
health and welfare in a bidding war to attract industry.64
Some have asserted that federalism in this context is nothing
more than decentralization-a device for using the states as regional
functionaries of federal authority.65 But the concept of state sover-
eignty, however vague, makes a crucial difference. It enhances the
states' ability to function independently, in part due to the power it
lends to the rhetoric of state politicians.6 It also contributes to the
states' legal ability to maintain independence, as the U.S. Department
of Justice's (DOJ's) "unitary executive" policy 7 amply demonstrates.
64. One commentator has explained:
A strong, unified regulatory system at the national level can ensure that envi-
ronmental concerns are not forgotten as local communities compete for eco-
nomic benefits. Funding on a national scale can help provide adequate
environmental controls in areas that otherwise could not afford them. Consis-
tency in environmental regulation throughout a nation can provide a predictable,
stable environment in which industry can function.
On the other hand . .. [d]ecentralized decisionmaking is flexible and can
respond to local concerns and conditions.
J. William Futrell, The Administration of Environmental Law, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw, supra note 9, at 118; see also Stewart, supra note 62, at 1210-12 (describing the advan-
tages of a decentralized system for creating appropriate local regulatory control, but also
suggesting that federally imposed standards would prevent states from abandoning the
environment in favor of economic development).
Professor Richard L. Revesz has argued that "there is no support in the theoretical
literature on interjurisdictional competition for the claim that, without federal interven-
tion, there will be a race to the bottom [by states] over environmental standards." Richard
L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1233 (1992). As an environmental
litigator from 1984-1993 and a state enforcement lawyer from 1984-1987, however, I saw
states respond repeatedly to arguments by members of the regulated community that stan-
dards needed to be reduced to attract economic development or to prevent companies
from moving to other jurisdictions. See Dispute over Air Permit Regulations Leads to Proposal in
Regulatoy Bill Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Apr. 27, 1995, at AA-1, AA-3 (reporting that U.S.
Justice Department officials believe that "a strong federal presence [is] needed in environ-
mental enforcement because [they] are concerned about large companies-which some-
times are the largest employers in a state-from exercising undue influence on state
agencies to get favorable interpretations"). Professor Revesz's analysis may demonstrate
limitations of "the theoretical literature on interjurisdictional competition," but it does not
call into serious question the need for federal standards to provide a minimum level of
environmental protection to all U.S. residents.
Minimum federal standards also help "prevent states or cities from victimizing their
neighbors" by releasing pollutants that cross political boundaries. NAPA REPORT, supra
note 32, at 2.
65. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 908.
66. See Robert Pear, Source of State Power is Pulledfrom Ashes, N.Y. TIMEs (nat'l ed.), Apr.
16, 1995, at 16 (reporting that the Tenth Amendment is "a political rallying cry [and] a
source of political inspiration").
67. The "unitary executive" policy prevents federal enforcement agencies from enforc-
ing the law effectively against other federal agencies. See infra notes 116-118 and accompa-
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IV. FEDERALISM AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
As illustrated below-primarily through the examples of
Superfund and RCRA-Congress and EPA must adhere to five basic
principles for cooperative federalism schemes to work well. A pro-
gram of cooperative federalism should: (1) provide for state imple-
mentation; (2) set clear standards; (3) reflect respect for state
autonomy; (4) provide mechanisms to police the process; and (5) ap-
ply the same rules to government and private parties. But even when
Congress and EPA have ignored many of these principles-as they
have under Superfund and RCRA-cooperative federalism can im-
prove the regulatory system.
A. Providing for State Implementation
The essence of cooperative federalism is that states take primary
responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining the
freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards.68 Even when
constrained by the need to meet minimum federal standards, every
permitting or cleanup decision involves countless judgment calls.
How agencies use their discretion to resolve detailed implementation
issues can have an enormous impact on whether the public will per-
ceive the overall decision as successful. State regulators usually can be
more responsive to the needs and concerns of affected citizens than
federal agencies.69
With an important exception, RCRA adopts a typical structure for
allowing qualified states to implement federal environmental policy.7"
Under Superfind, however, EPA violated this most basic principle of
nying text. The policy does not affect state enforcement, however, since the sovereignty of
the states prevents them from being considered part of the "unitary" executive.
68. See, e.g., RCRA § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929.
69. See Stewart, supra note 62, at 1210; Adam Babich, Coming to Grips with Toxic Waste:
The Need for Cooperative Federalism in the Superfund Program, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,009, 10,010 (Jan. 1989) (arguing that "relatively less rigid bureaucracies" of state and
local governments are more able to find cost-effective responses).
70. Under RCRA, a state seeking to administer and enforce a hazardous waste regula-
tory program applies to EPA for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b); Requirements for Authori-
zation of State Hazardous Waste Programs, 40 C.F.R. pt. 271. EPA must approve
applications that conform to regulatory requirements designed to ensure that the pro-
grams are "equivalent to" and "consistent with" the federal program and provide "ade-
quate" enforcement of compliance requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b); 40 C.F.R. § 271.4
to .19. Such state programs may be more stringent than federal law, but EPA may reject
aspects of a program that have no basis in human health or environmental protection and
effectively prohibit treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R.
§ 271.4(b). Also, states may not impose requirements that unreasonably impede free
movement of hazardous wastes across state borders to lawful treatment, storage, or disposal
facilities. Id. § 271.4(a).
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cooperative federalism, failing for over a decade to acknowledge that
any state could be trusted to direct the cleanup of released hazardous
substances.7" As explained below, in the context of Superfund, EPA
and Congress managed to turn cooperative federalism upside down,
leaving EPA as the entity responsible for implementing state-promul-
gated standards.
On its face, Superfund contains the most flexible statutory provi-
sion for cooperative federalism of any environmental law. It allows-
but does not require-the federal government to enter into agree-
ments with states to "carry out actions authorized in this section."71 2
The agreement "may cover a specific facility or specific facilities," but
presumably may also cover states as a whole.7" For the first thirteen
years of the Superfund program, however, EPA refused to delegate
any remedy-selection decisions to states.74 Apparently because Con-
gress merely authorized EPA to delegate instead of requiring it to do
so, the Agency saw no reason to relinquish any of its turf.75 In 1993,
Once authorized, a state implements its programs "in lieu of the Federal program"
and conducts it in accordance with federal regulations. Id. § 271.1 (g). State action that is
taken pursuant to an authorized hazardous waste program has "the same force and effect
as action taken by [EPA]." 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565,
1569 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
RCRA is somewhat unique in that it sets management standards for "solid waste" that
states and citizens, but not EPA, may enforce. See Solid Waste Preamble, supra note 17, at
50,979. These regulations implement 42 U.S.C. § 6945, which bans "open dumping" of
solid waste. "Open dumping" includes any solid-waste management practice that violates
EPA regulatory criteria for sanitary landfills. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(14).
71. Babich, supra note 69, at 10,009-10.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1)(A).
73. Id. § 9604(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
74. It was not until 1994 that EPA reportedly began to delegate such authority to states.
State Will Oversee Superfund Cleanup, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 22, 1994, at B-5
("Oklahoma has been put in charge by EPA to clean up a former zinc processing site ... as
part of an overall plan by EPA to allow states to take over cleanups to prevent superfund
listing or get the sites off the National Priorities List."); EPA Agrees to Defer Proposed NPL Site
Cleanup to State of Idaho, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Aug. 5, 1994, at A-1I (reporting that an
agreement "to let the state of Idaho assume the lead role in the cleanup of a proposed
National Priorities List mining waste site" is "the second of its kind nationally .... A
similar agreement has been reached on an Oklahoma site.").
EPA's failure to delegate, however, has not chilled all state action to protect citizens
against released hazardous substances. Indeed, "[t] he federal Superfund Law has, since its
enactment in 1980, inspired a great deal of imitation in the states." McELnSH & PENDER-
GRASS, supra note 19, at 3. This state activity is contemplated in Superfund itself. See 42
U.S.C. 9614(a) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting
any State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release
of hazardous substances within such State.").
75. As EPA first began to implement Superfund, the Agency's attempts to retain exclu-
sive control of hazardous substance cleanups threatened to run roughshod over the con-
cerns of state environmental agencies. States, therefore, attempted to control federal
discretion by independently enforcing-and threatening to enforce-state standards at
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the D.C. Circuit remanded a portion of the National Contingency
Plan (NCP) to EPA because the Agency failed "to offer any reasoned
explanation" of its refusal to delegate Superfund remedy-selection
and enforcement authorities to states.76
Because Congress required Superfund cleanups to meet both
state and federal "applicable or relevant and appropriate require-
ments" (ARARs), EPA often finds itself administering state-promul-
gated standards.77 Essentially all cooperative federalism programs
allow states to set standards that surpass the federal minimum level of
Superfund sites. EPA, however, struck back, asserting the right to preempt state environ-
mental laws in the 1985 NCP, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,912, 47,971, 47,973, despite Superfund's
non-preemption provision. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a). Several states appealed the 1985 NCP in
an action that Congress ultimately mooted by amending Superfund in 1986. Ohio v. EPA,
No. 86-1096 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Congress, in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, attempted to strike a balance. The law provides for some pre-
emption of state regulatory authority by stating that "[no Federal, State, or localpermit shall
be required for the portion of any removal or remedial action conducted entirely onsite,
where such remedial action is selected and carried out in compliance with this section." 42
U.S.C. § 9621 (e) (1) (emphasis added). This preemption generally does not affect under-
lying substantive standards, however, since Superfund cleanups generally must attain "any
promulgated standard... under a State environmental or facility siting law that is more
stringent than any Federal standard... and that has been identified to the President by
the State in a timely manner." 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii). Instead of a state enforcing
its standard directly, through a permit requirement, EPA is supposed to incorporate the
state standard into the federally enforced cleanup plan. Id.; Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520,
1526-27 (D.C. Cir. 1993). But see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
Superfund provides that "[a] State may enforce any... State standard.., to which the
remedial action is required to conform under this chapter in the United States district
court for the district in which the facility is located." 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e) (2). So far, how-
ever, the courts have essentially read this provision out of the statute. Colorado v. Idarado
Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that § 9621(e) (2) did not authorize a
district court to issue an injunction to enforce a state-selected remedial action plan), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 960 (1991). Nonetheless, states can continue to enforce state standards
under authority of state law, at least under some circumstances. See United States v. Colo-
rado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1578 (10th Cir. 1993) (allowing state enforcement of RCRA at a fed-
eral Superfund site), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
76. Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d at 1542. The NCP contains the regulations governing
Superfund cleanups. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300. It is ironic that EPA's refusal to delegate coincided
with President Ronald Reagan's order that:
Executive departments and agencies shall be guided by the following fundamen-
tal federalism principles:
(e) In most areas of governmental concern, the States uniquely possess the
constitutional authority, the resources, and the competence to discern the senti-
ments of the people and to govern accordingly. In Thomas Jefferson's words, the
States are "the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and
the surest bulwarks against antirepublican tendencies."
Exec. Order No. 12,612, § 2, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987), 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988).
77. "Applicable" requirements address the specific circumstances found at the site;
"relevant and appropriate" requirements address problems sufficiently similar to those en-
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stringency. But, under most federal environmental laws, states that go
beyond federal standards are directly responsible for administering
their more stringent programs, and thus, for handling whatever prac-
tical or political problems arise. In contrast, Superfund relies on
threats of financial burdens and waivers of state law to prevent states
from imposing standards that EPA deems needlessly stringent.78 This
scheme has pitted EPA against the states in a continuing battle to con-
trol the stringency of Superfund cleanups.79
B. Setting Clear Standards
Without clear, objective standards, a program of cooperative fed-
eralism cannot meet the goal of providing a minimum level of protec-
tion for the public and the environment. Minimum federal standards
allow federal agencies to restrain state and local tendencies to risk
public health and welfare on short-sighted attempts to provide an at-
tractive climate for businesses. But, unless those standards are reason-
ably clear and objective, federal oversight of state programs will be
arbitrary, ineffectual, or both. Although RCRA Subtitle C standards
doubtless could be improved and simplified,8" they are nonetheless
capable of reasonably objective application.8" Under Superfund, how-
ever, EPA compounded its failure to delegate implementation by fail-
ing to set clear standards for cleanups.
Superfund cleanups are governed by EPA's NCP, which provides
for remedy-selection decisions based on evaluation of nine criteria.'
countered that their use is well-suited to the site. Natural Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.5.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (3) (states must pay at least 10% of certain remedial costs and
assure future maintenance); id. § 9621 (d) (2) (C) (to be applied, state standards that "could
effectively result" in a statewide prohibition of land disposal must be of "general applicabil-
ity," adopted on the basis of "relevant considerations," and the state must arrange for pay-
ment of the incremental cost of applying them); id. § 9621 (d) (4) (state standards need not
be applied if, inter alia, they are technically impracticable, the remedial action will attain an
equivalent" "standard of performance," or they have not been consistently applied); id.
§ 9621(f) (3) (B) (states seek review of a federal decision not to apply a state standard
under a "not supported by substantial evidence" standard).
79. See Carolyn L. Buchholz, Can aJurisdictional Showdown Under Superfund Be Avoided?,
19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,327 (Aug. 1989) (discussing jurisdictional conflicts
pitting EPA and DOJ against Colorado, Montana, and Maryland); see also supra note 75.
80. See, e.g., supra notes 16-17.
81. The standards governing RCRA's corrective action program-a remedial action
program analogous to Superfund-are less clear than most RCRA Subtitle C regulations.
Indeed, by and large, they have yet to be promulgated. To date, however, EPA generally
has allowed states the necessary flexibility to implement the corrective action program
effectively.
82. These criteria are: (1) overall protection of the public and environment; (2) com-
pliance with ARARs; (3) long-term effectiveness; (4) reduction of toxicity, mobility or vol-
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Although these criteria appear to provide a solid framework for site-
by-site common-sense decision-making, EPA clearly did not design
them to achieve consistent results. Instead, stakeholders-including
states, local governments, potentially liable parties, and, ideally, poten-
tially affected members of the surrounding community-negotiate
with the Agency about a separate cleanup plan for each contaminated
site. Thus, in its current design, the Superfund program cannot pro-
vide citizens with a minimum level of protection regardless of whether
the federal government or the states administer it."5
C. Respecting State Autonomy
For states to serve as credible implementers of environmental pol-
icy, federal oversight must be conducted in a way that affords state
laws and institutions some degree of respect.8 4 The Superfund pro-
gram's ARARs process, under which EPA passes judgment on whether
states relied on "relevant considerations" when promulgating stan-
dards that are more stringent than their federal counterparts, is in-
consistent with this need for respect.85 As explained below, Congress
ume through treatment; (5) short-term effectiveness and impact; (6) "implementability";
(7) cost; (8) acceptability to the affected state; and (9) acceptability to the community. 40
C.F.R. § 300.430(e) (9) (iii) (A)-(I).
83. See Douglas J. Sarno, Risk and the New Rules of Decisionmaking: The Need for a Single
Risk Target, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,402 (July 1994) (arguing for a single na-
tional risk target to assure adequate and consistent levels of protection in all communities).
EPA's practice of developing separate standards for each affected community complicates
the government's attempts to provide for environmental equity and justice.
84. The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) has recommended that
EPA "reward good state performance with additional autonomy and flexibility." NAPA
REPORT, supra note 32, at 34. NAPA endorsed the idea of "differential oversight" to "match
EPA's intervention in the state to the state's success in achieving desired results." Id. at 29.
NAPA explains that:
[for] states with the best programs, the most responsible businesses, the most
satisfied constituencies, and the best environmental results... EPA would be able
to forgo review of routine permits entirely, reduce state reporting required under
the grants, and allow the states considerable latitude in deciding how best to allo-
cate EPA grant funds among problems and activities....
States, and by extension their businesses, whose performance is lacking...
would be subjected to additional oversight and EPA control .... EPA would treat
states in the middle of the list accordingly, granting more or less discretion to
particular programs or industries as deserved.
Id. at 29-30. EPA appears to be moving toward implementing NAPA's suggestions. State-
EPA Accord Dramatically Scales Back Federal Oversight INSIDE E.P.A. WEEKLY REPORT (Special
Report), June 5, 1995, at 1 (reprinting a proposal by EPA and some state officials for a
"National Environmental Performance Parmership System" that conterfiplates, inter alia,
differential oversight).
85. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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displayed a similar lack of respect for state autonomy in the way that it
handled changes to the requirements of the federal RCRA program.
EPA constantly supplements and changes environmental regula-
tions and Congress occasionally changes the statutes. Sovereign
states, therefore, require a reasonable period of time for their legisla-
tors and agencies to make necessary conforming changes. Moreover,
EPA needs additional time to approve the state changes as "consis-
tent" with the federal program. 8 Thus, there will be a necessary lag
between adoption of federal policies, and the implementation of
those policies by states. Most environmental programs, including
those portions of RCRA enacted before its amendment in 1984, pro-
vide for a reasonable grace period to allow for continued state
implementation. 7
In 1984, however, Congress became unwilling to accept the inevi-
table delays associated with cooperative federalism. Thus, when enact-
ing the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA),88
it created an exception to the authority of EPA-authorized states to
regulate in lieu of the federal government. As amended, RCRA re-
quires that each HSWA requirement, and each regulation that imple-
ments such a requirement, take effect on the same date in every
state.8 9 Pending EPA's approval of each state's incorporation of each
such requirement into its program, RCRA requires EPA to implement
it directly.9°
As a result, a state can essentially never achieve primacy in RCRA
implementation 9 and RCRA implementation has become incredibly
confusing.9" Cooperative federalism under RCRA, therefore, has be-
86. See supra note 70 for a discussion of EPA's approval process for state plans.
87. See 40 C.F.1L § 271.21(e)(1), (2). During this grace period, changes to the federal
program do not take effect in authorized states. Id. Accordingly, the effective dates of
RCRA regulations-including additions to lists of regulated substances-can vary geo-
graphically depending on the authorization status of particular states. See Aaron H.
Goldberg, The Federal Hazardous Waste Program: A House of Cards?, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 365,
366 (1995).
88. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(g)(1).
90. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 271.3(b) (3).
91. Because EPA has yet to promulgate several required HSWA regulations, state pro-
grams are unlikely to catch up with federal requirements any time soon. (For example,
presently EPA has yet to issue final regulations fully implementing HSWA's corrective ac-
tion requirements.) Thus, in most states, EPA continues to receive applications for RCRA
permits and enforce some HSWA-based RCRA regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 271.19(0.
92. Rather than treating all RCRA regulatory changes the same, RCRA, as amended,
applies a special rule to statutory provisions added by HSWA and to regulations that imple-
ment HSWA. EPA, however, continues to change RCRA regulations in ways unrelated to
HSWA. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Watkins, 969 F.2d 1122, 1132-33 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding
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come an irritant to the regulated community, that-depending on the
applicable state-may or may not be justified by the state's willingness
to apply greater flexibility to implementation. For states, RCRA's co-
operative federalism program is part of a pattern of complexity that
has generally prevented them from attempting significant
innovations.
9 3
D. Policing the Process
Federal regulators should not expect to agree with every decision
made by their counterparts in state government. But allowing states
to ignore minimum substantive and procedural standards would en-
danger the credibility of the regulatory system. For cooperative feder-
alism to be effective, the states' commitments to implement federal
standards must be enforceable.
Because delegation under Superfund has been so limited, 4 polic-
ing state compliance with minimum federal standards has not been a
that EPA made a "regulatory change" through a 1986 notice that interpreted pre-HSWA
RCRA provisions). And for such non-HSWA regulatory changes, states still have a grace
period within which to adopt federal changes. Thus, the existence of a grace period (dur-
ing which a regulatory change may go unimplemented), and the identity of the regulator
that will implement the change, depends not on when EPA promulgates the change but,
instead, on when Congress amended RCRA to provide authority for it. Fortunately, when
promulgating RCRA regulations, EPA makes a point of discussing implementation and
effective dates in its Federal Register preambles to the regulations. See e.g., Hazardous
Waste Management Systems; Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste; Toxicity Char-
acteristics Revisions, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,798 (1990) (modifying the toxicity characteristic of
RCRA's Subchapter III definition of hazardous waste pursuant to HSWA).
Moreover, states do not need, and rarely await, EPA authorization to enforce state law.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6929; 40 C.F.R. § 271.1(i); McElfish, supra note 58, § 6.01 [1], at 6-3 (observ-
ing that "the federal statutory overlay does not 'empower' the states .... Rather it enlists
the states to exercise their inherent authority.") (footnote omitted). And there usually will
be delays between states' adoption of regulations to conform to HSWA-based require-
ments, submission of applications to EPA for authority to implement the regulations, and
EPA's grant of approval. EPA and the states may thus enforce separate versions of essen-
tially the same requirements while authorization is pending. In such situations, unwary
regulated entities that meet the requirements of only one sovereign may miss important
deadlines enforced by the other.
93. Indeed, some states "simply incorporate the federal rules by reference." Hazardous
Waste Management System; Definition of Hazardous Waste; "Mixture" and "Derived-From"
Rules, 57 Fed. Reg. 7628, 7630 (1992) [hereinafter Mixture Rule Interim Promulgation];
cf James M. McElfishJr., Minimal Stringency: Abdication of State Innovation, 25 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003 (Jan. 1995) (noting that "[m]any states have turned the floors that
federal environmental mandates establish into ceilings").
94. Although it has generally refused to delegate remedy-selection authority, EPA has
delegated other responsibilities to the states using a variety of types of agreements. U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 9375.6-08C, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PRO-
GRAMS, 50-STATE STUDY, 1993 UPDATE 13-14 (1993) (prepared by the Environmental Law
Institute) [hereinafter ELI 50"STATE STUDY].
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significant issue. In general, however, Superfund allows EPA discre-
tion to set forth the terms of delegation in the provisions of the con-
tract or cooperative agreement that provides for it.95 If the state fails
to comply, the federal government may sue "to enforce the contract
or to recover any funds advanced or any costs incurred because of the
breach."96 Moreover, Superfund provides states with a powerful in-
centive to follow federal law: It authorizes only states that follow the
NCP to recover their response costs from responsible parties. 97
In contrast, RCRA has a relatively elaborate mechanism for polic-
ing state compliance. EPA actively oversees state implementation and
requires that states afford it unrestricted access to information.98 If a
state program changes or is interpreted or implemented in a way that
fails to meet minimum federal requirements, EPA may withdraw its
authorization.99 EPA reviews, and may terminate, state permits and
may suspend or revoke interim status. 00 Moreover, RCRA allows EPA
to comment on draft state RCRA permits and then, if the state does
not respond to EPA's satisfaction, enforce certain comments as if they
were permit conditions. 1°' EPA may also issue compliance orders or
bring enforcement actions in states with authorized programs after
providing notice to the applicable state. 102
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1)(B).
96. Id. § 9604(d) (2).
97. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (A).
98. 40 C.F.R. § 271.17(a) (1994).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e); 40 C.F.R. § 271.22. Although EPA has authority to withdraw
the authorization of states with programs that fail to meet federal standards, the Agency is
understandably hesitant to do so. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938
F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding EPA's decision not to withdraw North Carolina's
RCRA program). Such a withdrawal would be politically difficult. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, it would require EPA to hire staff and identify funding to administer the program
itself. Thus, for example, when the State of New Mexico refused until 1989 to make
changes to its state hazardous waste program to conform to a 1986 change to the minimum
standards of the federal program, EPA did not exercise its authority to withdraw New Mex-
ico's authorization. See New Mexico v. Watkins, 969 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see
also NAPA REPORT, supra note 32, at 27 ("As a practical matter, EPA's ability to retake
control of delegated state programs is tightly constrained by resources and political
pressures.").
100. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (2); 40 C.F.R. § 271.19(e).
101. 40 C.F.R. § 271.19(b), (e)(2). States also generally must "provide at least 30 days
for public comment on all proposed settlements of [RCRA] civil enforcement actions." Id.
§ 271.16(d) (2) (iii).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (2). When EPA enforces provisions of programs that have been
delegated to a state, however, EPA enforces the state provision itself, since that provision
applies "in lieu of" federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).
As noted in note 70, sup-a, however, Congress failed to grant EPA specific authority to
enforce RCRA § 4005, 42 U.S.C. § 6945, which governs management of domestic waste and
other garbage. See Solid Waste Preamble, supra note 17, at 50,979. But, RCRA § 4005 does
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Like most federal antipollution laws, RCRA relies on citizen suit
provisions to supplement EPA enforcement. By providing a federal
cause of action to enforce minimum standards-even in states with
authorized programs-RCRA citizen suit provisions empower mem-
bers of the public to police the cooperative federalism process and
supplement state enforcement efforts.""3 Opportunities for citizen
enforcement thus help ensure that state-implemented environmental
programs continue to meet minimum federal standards. In contrast,
Superfund citizen suits have generally proven impractical because of
Congress's poorly thought-out decision to remove challenges to most
federal actions under Superfund from the jurisdiction of federal
courts. 
1 0 4
Recently, under the Clean Air Act, Congress improved the utility
of citizen suits in policing the process of cooperative federalism. As
amended in 1990, that Act allows citizens who believe that a state has
issued an illegal permit to petition EPA to veto that permit. If EPA
fails to do so within sixty days of the petition, the citizen has a right to
appeal EPA's decision, and thus has an opportunity to recover reason-
able costs and fees.1" 5 By providing citizens with a realistic chance to
challenge state-issued permits, this provision greatly enhances the bar-
provide for citizen suit enforcement and-under RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972, "any
person" may bring a citizen suit. Moreover, in the 1992 Federal Facilities Compliance Act,
infra note 120, Congress added federal agencies to RCRA's definition of "person," 42
U.S.C. § 6903(15). Thus, EPA now has the option of filing citizen suits to protect the
public and the environment from violations of solid waste criteria.
103. See Adam Babich, Is RCRA Enforceable by Citizen Suit in States with Authorized Hazard-
ous Waste Programs?, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envti. L. Inst.) 10,536 (Sept. 1993) (arguing that
RCRA § 3006(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(a)-which allows EPA-authorized states to regulate haz-
ardous waste "in lieu of" the EPA Subtitle C program--does not preclude citizen suits
concerning violations of such programs under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(A)); see also 49 Fed. Reg. 48,300, 48,304 (1984) ("[Ift is EPA's position that
the citizen suit provision of RCRA is available to all citizens whether or not a state is author-
ized"); 45 Fed. Reg. 85,016, 85,020-21 (1980) ("any person, whether in an authorized or
unauthorized State, may sue to enforce compliance with statutory and regulatory
standards").
104. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h); see McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d
325 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that citizen suits that challenge elements of an ongoing
Superfund cleanup are barred). See generally Babich, supra note 21, at 54 ("[B]ecause
[Superfund] insulates EPA decisions from review, it provides no incentives for the agency
to pay real attention to public comment. One can hardly expect overworked government
officials to give much credence to the opinions of people who have no meaningful ability
to challenge their decisions."); Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste
Cleanup: Expanding Public Participation in the Federal Superfund Program, 21 FoRaDHi- U".
L.J. 671, 685 (1994) ("Congress should amend the Superfund statute to allow community
groups to enforce their right to participate in the Superfund process.").
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7661d.
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gaining power of citizens during the permitting process. 106 It remains
to be seen, however, whether Congress will adopt a similar provision
when it next re-authorizes RCRA. 0 7
E. Applying the Same Rules to Government and Private Parties
A basic principle of modem antipollution law is that no entity is
above the law. Instead, the laws generally apply equally to every
party-whether an individual, a private company, or a government-
that engages in regulated conduct.' Thus, both Superfund and
RCRA-like the Clean Air and Water Acts before them-mandate
that federal agencies "be subject to, and comply with" the law "in the
same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substan-
tively, as any nongovernmental entity."1"9 Similarly-like other anti-
pollution laws-both Superfund and RCRA apply to "any person" and
define "person" to include states and municipalities.11 0
Although the courts have enforced it inconsistently,"' the princi-
ple that no entity is above the law has enabled Superfund and RCRA
to put a dent in the government-generated pollution problem." 2
106. See Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation, 25 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,141 (Mar. 1995).
107. EPA has proposed to amend Clean Water Act regulations to require states to afford
interested persons the right to challenge approval or denial of state-issued Clean Water Act
permits in state courts. Amendment to Requirements for Authorized State Permit Pro-
grams Under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,588 (proposed rule) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 123) (1995).
108. There are exceptions, however, notably the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which does not apply
directly to the United States government. Section 329 of the Act limits the Act's coverage
to facilities that "are owned or operated [or controlled] by the same person." 42 U.S.C.
§ 11049(4). The definition of "person" does not include federal agencies. Id. § 11049(7).
Therefore, the Act does not cover federal facilities unless they are owned or operated in
part by nonfederal parties, e.g., government contractors.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (Superfund); id. § 6961 (RCRA); id. § 7418(a) (Clean Air
Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (Clean Water Act).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (Superfund); id. § 6903(15) (RCRA); see Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7, 13 (1989) (holding that Congress imposed liability by nam-
ing states as "persons" in Superfund and waived the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the
states from suit for money damages by private citizens in federal court); Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (-there is no tradition of immunity for municipal
corporations"); Turner v. EPA, 848 F. Supp. 711, 718 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (dismissing citizen-
suit "claims for monetary relief against the State of Mississippi [which] are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment"); Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found. v. Mazurkiewicz. 712 F. Supp.
1184, 1187 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit
against a state official for alleged violations of federal law, even when the state is the real
party in interest).
111. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct 1627 (1992).
112. After a decade-long struggle, the State of Colorado recently won a battle to apply
RCRA to a federal facility. Peters et al., supra note 28, at 10,419.
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When this principle is applied to cooperative federalism, no govern-
ment need be in the position of being the sole regulator of its own
conduct (a situation that invites trouble). 113 Moreover, forcing each
government to put up with independent oversight can provide a re-
freshing dose of reality. Thus, for example, before insisting on "gold-
plated" cleanups at federal facilities, states must face the question of
whether they can afford to meet the same standards at landfills owned
and operated by their political subdivisions. And before insisting on
extensive cleanups of private Superfund sites, the federal government
should be prepared to attain the same standards at federal facilities.1 14
State sovereignty has been an essential tool in the battle to im-
pose regulatory controls on dangerously contaminated federal facili-
ties."1 5 Indeed, to date, state sovereignty has proven to be the most
effective answer to DOJ's decision to employ its "unitary executive pol-
icy" to cripple EPA's ability to police the conduct of federal pol-
luters." 6 The unitary-executive policy is premised on the notion that
all executive agencies work for the same sovereign. If one agency
were to sue another, according to the policy, the executive branch, in
essence, would be suing itself, leaving no case of actual controversy to
which Article III jurisdiction could attach.117 The practical import of
the policy is that the same DOJ lawyers represent both polluting fed-
eral agencies and federal enforcers. Thus, absent vigorous enforce-
ment by states and citizens, the activities of federal polluters go largely
"unchecked by any parties whose interest are in any real sense adverse
to those of the [polluters]. 'q1 s
113. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
114. See Environmentalists, States Blast DOE Plan to Break Cleanup Deals, INSIDE E.PA, Jan.
13, 1995, at 1.
115. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 32 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); New Mexico v.
Watkins, 969 F.2d 1122, 1132-33 (D.C. Cir. 1992); ELR UPDATE, Feb. 28, 1994, at 1 ("A
district court issued an order, stipulated to by Sierra Club, DOE, and Colorado, that estab-
lishes an enforceable schedule for DOE to submit information associated with a RCRA
permit application for radioactive mixed waste units at the Rocky Flats plant near Denver,
Colorado.").
116. See U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FEDERAL FACIITIES COMPLIANCE STRATEGY VI-
3, app. H (Nov. 1988) (setting forth DOJ's unitary executive policy in 1987 testimony of F.
Henry Habicht); Maine v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322, 338 n.8 (D.
Me. 1988) (magistrate's opinion) ("The United States' position is that EPA has no author-
ity to proceed against the federal government."), vacated on other grounds, 973 F.2d 1007
(1st Cir. 1992).
117. In reality, of course, administrative agencies do not act as a unitary whole but have
disparate missions and interests.
118. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D. Colo.
1989). The court also noted:
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Not surprisingly, given the legal theories that the nation's top en-
forcers have adopted, the federal government's record of compliance
with its own laws is one of "flagrant" violation. 9 Only the principle
that no government is above the law-recently reinforced by Congress
in the Federal Facilities Compliance Actl 2°-has allowed states and
citizen enforcers to gain a toe-hold in the struggle to force the govern-
ment to obey its own laws. 2 '
The strength of cooperative federalism-that it forces sovereign
regulators to function on overlapping turf, regulate one another, and
feel the frustration of dealing with independent oversight-is also a
source of stress and volatility. Indeed, after championing the princi-
ple of equal treatment under the law for decades, 122 Congress recently
Since it is the E.PT 's job to achieve a clean up as quickly and thoroughly as
possible, and since the... obvious financial interest [of the Army, the owner of
the contaminated site at issue] is to spend as little money and effort as possible on
the cleanup, I cannot imagine how one attorney can vigorously and wholeheart-
edly advocate both positions.
Id.
EPA employs lawyers who are dedicated to enforcing environmental laws against fed-
eral polluters. But because DOJ has undercut the legal ability of those lawyers to take
independent action, their impact is reduced.
119. Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Energy, 770 F. Supp. 578, 584 (D. Colo. 1991)
(finding that DOE's "demonstrated attitude is that it is a governmental agency that can
avoid RCRA's mandates indefinitely with impunity" and that "DOE's ongoing disregard for
RCRA's linchpin permit process [at Rocky Flats] has been flagrant."); see also Sierra Club v.
United States Dep't of Energy, 734 F. Supp. 946, 947-48 (D. Colo. 1990) ("DOE . . . has
been obligated, but has failed, to apply for a RCRA permit [for certain mixed waste opera-
tions] at Rocky Flats"). In 1987, Ohio Attorney General Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr. told
Congress that "DOE's attitude toward compliance has been as bad as [that of] the worst
private sector violators.... [While DOE] now pays lip service to some of the environmen-
tal laws, its compliance with those laws falls short of an acceptable standard." GAO Piuoiu-
TIES REPORT, supra note 29, at 27 (footnote omitted).
120. Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992).
121. See supra note 115; see also, e.g., Sierra Club, 734 F. Supp. at 946 (granting partial
summary judgment to plaintiff and finding that certain materials stored at Rocky Flats are
subject to RCRA); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Tenn.
1984) (holding RCRA and CWA apply to a federal nuclear weapons plant and granting
relief to the plaintiff).
122. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text. During enactment of the 1977
Clean Water Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, for example, Congress
expressed its disapproval of EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976), which had construed
narrowly the Act's previous waiver of immunity. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.CAN. 4326, 4392 (explaining that the Supreme Court has
misconstrued the original intent of the 1972 amendments, which was to subject all federal
facilities to the provisions of state and local pollution laws). Congress's response was to
adopt the broad waiver of the Clean Air Act into the Clean Water Act, waiving immunity as
to any sanctions. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to give full effect to this
language. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992). The Court
found the Clean Water Act mandate that the Government "be liable only for those civil
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has taken tentative steps toward eroding it. Recent Superfund reform
proposals have included a "cap" on the liability of state and local gov-
ernmental owners and operators of landfills, and two senators have
introduced a bill intended to "serve as a pilot" for exempting federal
facilities from federal, state, and local environmental requirements."' 3
Also, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995124 tends to elevate
penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State .. . court... to enforce [its]
order or... process," 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a), to be obscure, stating:
The question is still what Congress could have meant in using a seemingly expan-
sive phrase like "civil penalties arising under federal law." Perhaps it used it just
in case some later amendment might waive the government's immunity from pu-
nitive sanctions. Perhaps a drafter mistakenly had somehow been waived already.
Perhaps someone was careless. The question has no satisfactory answer.
Id. at 1639. Congress's enactment of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, supra note 120,
was a response to this ruling.
123. See Steven M. Jawetz, The Superfund Reform Act of 1994: Success or Failure Is Within
EPA's Sole Discretion, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envd. L. Inst.) 10,161, 10,165-66 (Apr. 1994) (dis-
cussing proposed limitations on municipal liability for response costs under Superfund);
States Propose DOE Review Panel to Study Federal Cleanups, INSIDE EPA's SUPERFUND REPORT,
June 14, 1995, at 3, 4 (discussing the Hanford Land Management Act, S. 871, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995), which Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska) andJ. BennettJohnston (D-La.) intro-
duced to exempt DOE's activities at the Hanford nuclear reservation from environmental
laws and from an intergovernmental agreement).
124. S. 1,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Section 101 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act (UMRA) amends Tide IV of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974 (CBICA), 2 U.S.C. § 651 (1988). Although Congress presented the Act to the
President for signature, UMRA § 101 is, in reality, a mere "exercise of the rulemaking
power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively." UMRA § 108(1).
Each congressional house may "change such rules (so far as relating to such House) at any
time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of each
House." Id. § 108(2).
As amended by UMRA § 101, CBICA § 424 requires the Congressional Budget Office
to prepare statements about public bills reported by Senate or House committees. The
Budget Office statements must identify those bills containing intergovernmental mandates
and private-sector mandates that would impose direct costs of $50 million and $100 million
or more, respectively, in the fiscal year of the mandate's effective date or in any one of the
four following fiscal years. These threshold amounts are to be adjusted annually for infla-
tion. As amended, CBICA § 425(a) now provides that it "shall not be in order in the Sen-
ate or the House of Representatives to consider" bills that lack a Budget Office statement,
or that impose direct costs that exceed the threshold for intergovernmental mandates with-
out providing federal funds to pay those costs. CBICA § 425(a).
The Act is largely silent on Senate procedures for the disposition of points of order,
but presumably the Senate may waive those points on motion by a majority vote. But
under the amended CBICA § 426 (a) "[i] t shall not be in order in the House of Represent-
atives to consider a rule or order that waives the application of section 425." Id. § 426(a).
But, nonetheless, the House may decide to vote on the underlying legislation. CBICA
§ 426(b) (3) states: "As disposition of points of order under section 425 or [§ 426(a) ], the
Chair shall put the question of consideration with respect to the proposition that is the
subject of the points of order." Id. § 426(b) (3). Thus, rather than preventing the House
from considering the merits of a bill containing an unfunded mandate, § 426(a) merely
shuts off a procedural mechanism that might otherwise have allowed the House to avoid a
separate vote on whether to consider the bill notwithstanding the mandate. Id. § 426(a).
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the importance of state and local governmental compliance costs
above private compliance costs.1
25
From its title and political context, one might expect the un-
funded mandates law to be about federal attempts to coerce states and
local governments into implementing regulatory programs without
adequate federal funding.126 But, when implemented by mandates-
The UMRA requires that the House Committee on Rules include on a report "a sepa-
rate item identifying all waivers of points of order relating to Federal mandates." UMRA
§ 107. Such waivers may be rare, however, since a decision to consider a bill under CBICA
§ 426(b) (3), notwithstanding an unfunded mandate, would be a disposition of a point of
order rather than a waiver. But CBICA § 426(b) (3) also allows the House to vote to over-
ride CBICA § 426(a) and, thus, consider "a rule or order that waives the application of
section 425." These votes, presumably, would be listed as waivers pursuant to UMRA § 107.
As amended, CBICA § 423(e) requires Senate and House committees to include in
committee reports "an explicit statement on the extent to which the [accompanying] bill
or joint resolution is intended to preempt any State, local, or tribal law, and if so, an expla-
nation of the effect of such preemption." Although the UMRA contains no provision to
enforce CBICA § 423(e), litigants may find that the lack of a statement about preemption
in a committee report will constitute powerful evidence that Congress did not intend a
provision to preempt state or local law. Indeed, for this reason CBICA § 423(e) may turn
out to be the most far-reaching and constructive provision of the UMRA.
UMRA Title II addresses administrative action, requiring, inter alia, cost-benefit analy-
ses and analysis of regulatory alternatives when federal mandates may result in governmen-
tal or private sector expenditures of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any
one year. UMRA § 202(a). Agencies that promulgate rules imposing such mandates must
consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and select the least costly, most
cost-effective, or least burdensome that achieves the rule's objectives unless it would be
inconsistent with law for the agencies to do so, or the agencies explain why the least costly,
most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative was not adopted. UMRA § 205(a).
UMRA Title IV provides for judicial review of such agency statements. If an agency fails to
prepare a statement required by Title II, a court may require the agency to do so. UMRA
§ 401 (a) (2) (b). The agency's failure "shall not be used as a basis for staying.., or other-
wise affecting such agency rule." UMRA § 401 (a) (3).
Additionally, UMRA §§ 203 and 204 require agencies to plan for enhanced agency
consultation with certain state and local governments. UMRA § 204(b) exempts certain
intergovernmental meetings from the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
The UMRA does not affect certain categories of legislative and regulatory action. Sec-
tion 4 of the UMRA generally excludes from the Act's coverage those laws and regulations
that enforce constitutional rights, prohibit discrimination, require compliance with ac-
counting and auditing procedures with respect to grants, provide for emergency relief at
the request of state, local, or tribal governments, provide for national security, ratify or
implement treaty obligations, qualify as emergency legislation, or relate to the Social Se-
curity Act. UMRA § 4.
125. See supra note 124.
126. See The Mandates Bill WASH. PosT, Mar. 21, 1995, at A16 (praising the unfunded-
mandates bill, apparently on the mistaken assumption that the bill addresses situations in
which "a hard-up Congress" delegates duties to states and local governments via "hand-
offs"); see also SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WORKS STAFF REPORT, ANALY-
SIS OF THE UNFUNDED MANDATES SURVEYS CONDUCTED BY THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS
AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES (1994) (addressing the "gap between the
authorization of environmental programs and the amount appropriated to support their
implementation"). The plain language of the unfunded mandates bill addresses state and
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as opposed to incentives-congressional attempts to "commandee[r]
the legislative processes of the States" were illegal before passage of
the new law.12 7 Moreover, the substantive provisions of the new legis-
lation do not address the federal government's practice of using in-
centives to coerce states and local governments into acting as
environmental regulators.1 28 Instead, the law is crafted to discourage
enactment of new, unfunded compliance obligations applicable to state
and local governments that act in the following capacities: (1) as
members of the larger regulated community engaged in the same
conduct as private companies, e.g., entities that maintain buildings
and vehicles, generate air pollution, and own and operate landfills;
and (2) as entities that supply goods or services usually provided by
governments, e.g., drinking water, although such services could be
provided by private companies.
Proponents of unfunded mandates reform generally argued that
federal law imposes unreasonable compliance obligations, a favorite
example being the obligation to monitor drinking water supplies.2 9
If federal regulations are unreasonable, however, they should be
changed for all members of the regulated community, notjust for gov-
ernments. Singling out governmental entities for special treatment
deprives other members of the regulated community of important al-
lies in arguing for reasonable regulations.'" In fact, such laws may
increase the compliance burden of private companies, as regulators
attempt to achieve environmental goals without imposing costs on
governmental polluters.
The results of a system that puts governmental polluters above
the law are apparent at Department of Defense and Department of
Energy sites in this country, and in even more contaminated sites else-
where in the world.' 1 Aided by Our Federalism, however, United
States environmental policy-makers have established a clear trend to-
local governmental compliance costs rather than costs of state implementation, which are
incurred pursuant to incentives rather than mandates.
127. See supra note 55.
128. The new subsections 421(5) and (7) of CBICA, as added by the UMRA, define
"federal intergovernmental mandate" and "federal private sector mandate" to apply pri-
marily to "enforceable dut[ies]." UMRA § 101.
129. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S1305 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1995) (remarks of Sen.
Kempthorne).
130. See supra note 42.
131. CLOSING THE CIRCLE, supra note 28, at 75-77 (describing nuclear waste problems in
other countries, especially Russia); see aboWilliamJ. Broad, NudearRouette in Russia: Bury-
ing Uncontained Waste, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1994, at Al.
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wards independent oversight of all governmental polluters.'3 2 Iso-
lated missteps, such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, will not
reverse this trend. Instead such legislation is best understood as an
unfortunate by-product of an essentially healthy tension between
sovereigns.
CONCLUSION
It is tempting to conclude that cooperative federalism in the haz-
ardous waste field has failed. Clearly, Congress and EPA have made
fundamental mistakes that have limited the doctrine's utility. Indeed,
at one time or another, they have violated each of the five, relatively
uncontroversial, principles of cooperative federalism identified in this
Article.133  Nonetheless, cooperative federalism has caused states to
build the capacity to grapple with problems posed by hazardous waste
on a sophisticated level.15 4
Even in the face of EPA's refusal to delegate under Superfund,
most states have accepted the challenge of attempting to clean up
contaminated property.1 35 The informed comments of state regula-
tors-concerned about the enforceability and effectiveness of their
own state programs-have helped shape EPA's development of haz-
ardous waste regulations and Congress's statutory initiatives.1 3 6 The
132. Federal agencies, however, continue to seek exemptions. For example, the Clinton
administration's first Superfund reform proposal would have "overrule[d] United States v.
Colorado," 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1003), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994), allowing EPA
to insulate federal sites from state enforcement by listing those sites on the national priori-
ties list. Jawetz, supra note 123, at 10,163; see also WastedEnergy, WALL ST.J., Mar. 16, 1995,
at A22 (reporting that Assistant Secretary of Energy Tom Grumbly believes that forcing
DOE to comply with RCRA's minimum aisle space requirements is "mindless").
133. The government has violated principle 1 (provide for state implementation), see
supra notes 71, 74-76 and accompanying text; principle 2 (set clear standards), see supra
notes 82-83 and accompanying text; principle 3 (respect state autonomy), see supra notes
85, 90-91 and accompanying text; principle 4 (police the process), see supra note 99; and
principle 5 (apply the same rules to government and private parties), see supra notes 116,
123-125 and accompanying text.
134. The federal government has turned repeatedly to former state regulators to fill
important federal posts. For example, EPA Administrator Carol Browner and Deputy Ad-
ministrator Fred Hanson are both former state environmental officials.
135. "The majority of the State programs have authorities and capabilities similar to the
Federal Superfund program." ELI 50-STATE STUDY, supra note 94, at 7.
136. See, e.g., Mixture Rule Interim Promulgation, supra note 93, at 7630 (reinstating
certain rules on an interim basis in part because "[t]hirty-eight State Attorneys General
and many State solid waste management officials have stated that if the rules are allowed to
lapse, the regulatory structure would be thrown into chaos"); Notice of Public Meeting on
the RCRA Hazardous Waste Identification System, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,376, 61,376 (1992) (not-
ing that EPA withdrew its proposed Hazardous Waste Identification Rule "after review of
pubic comments revealed a variety of concerns expressed by environmental groups, indus-
try, and states over the options presented"); cf. State Groups Express Concerns with Parts of
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existence of state programs can also serve, at times, to moderate shifts
in federal law' 37 and to ease the burden on regulated entities."' 8
Moreover, minimum federal standards, accompanied by federal over-
sight of state programs, have produced a relatively consistent and pow-
erful body of law.
But it is as a tool against federally generated pollution that coop-
erative federalism has been most important. Although the battle to
subject federal facilities to independent state oversight may be far
from won,' 39 it is also far from lost. And, surely, nobody expected it to
House Panel-Approved Clean Water Bill, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 31, 1995, at A-7 (report-
ing on lobbying efforts by the National Conference of State Legislatures Environment
Committee's Chair in opposition to proposed Clean Water Act revisions "that would un-
dermine the states' progress in protecting water quality").
137. For example, when a court recently invalidated certain elements of EPA's defini-
tion of hazardous waste, state laws based on the EPA rules were not necessarily affected. See
Mixture Rule Interim Promulgation, supra note 93, at 7630 (noting that
"[i]mplementation of RCRA requirements is, in large part, carried out by authorized State
hazardous waste management programs, many of which currently have 'mixture' and 'de-
rived-from' rules as a matter of independent State law"). See generallyJames E. Satterfield,
EPA's Mixture Rule: Why the Fuss?, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,712 (Dec. 1994)
(discussing the status of the mixture and derived-from rules).
138. As an environmental lawyer practicing primarily in Colorado from 1984-1992, I
found that it was consistently more efficient to work with state regulators than with EPA.
When working with state regulators, I could often speak face-to-face with a regulator who
would take responsibility for the decision at hand. Thus, I could address his or her con-
cerns directly. In contrast, EPA regional lawyers tended, in my experience, to avoid diffi-
cult substantive discussions by citing a need to follow directions from EPA headquarters or
other remote decision-makers. Moreover, my experience was that state regulators made
decisions much more promptly than their federal counterparts. The relative merits of
working with state and federal bureaucracies, however, presumably varies from state to
state, and from program to program.
139. For example, DOE's management of materials that are regulated solely by the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2021, 2022-2286i (1988), is not subject to
independent oversight. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (excluding source, special nuclear, or
byproduct material as defined by the AEA from RCRA's definition of "solid waste" and,
thus, from RCRA regulation); 10 C.F.R. pt. 962 (the hazardous waste component of radio-
active mixed waste is subject to RCRA regulation, but the radioactive component is subject
solely to the AEA). See generally Dan W. Reicher, Nuclear Energy and Weapons, in SUSTAINABLE
ENmRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 9, at 903 ("In a decision that would have serious conse-
quences in the following decade, Congress did not give the [Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion] any licensing or regulatory authority over defense nuclear activities, leaving [one of
DOE's predecessor agencies, the Energy Research and Development Administration] as its
own safety watchdog."). See also Babich, supra note 31, at 11-12 (noting that "[u]ntil the
late 1980s, [DOE] limited the information available to regulators by, literally, blindfolding
government inspectors for portions of some visits to weapons production facilities" and
that, into the 1990s, DOE "continued to hide key pages of its permit applications from the
public by designating them 'unclassified controlled nuclear information'-i.e., secret
[under 10 C.F.R. pt. 1017].").
DOE regulates itself and its contractors largely through a series of illegally promul-
gated and, thus, unenforceable "DOE Orders." See Plaintiffs Sentencing Memorandum,
United States v. Rockwell International Corp., Criminal Case No. 92-CR-107, at 111 (P.
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be easy to force the world's most powerful sovereign to obey its own
laws. The progress we have made to date is powerful testimony to
both the framers' wisdom in preserving the sovereignty of the several
states and the 91st Congress's good sense in adapting the federalist
structure to the problem of environmental protection.
140
In an age when so many of the world's nations are struggling with
the effects of pollution from governmental facilities that operate
above the law, the United States has been fortunate, indeed, to dis-
cover that one of the "happy incidents of the federal system" 1 ' is that
it can cause its various governments to begin to regulate each other.
Colo., filed Mar. 26, 1992) ("Failure to follow the legally required rulemaking procedures
means DOE's orders and regulations are not enforceable.").
In CLOSING THE CIRCLE, supra note 28, DOE took an unprecedented step in providing
the public with a detailed acknowledgment of the environmental damage it wrought dur-
ing the Cold War. But even if-as Closing the Circle seems to demonstrate-DOE is cur-
rently under responsible leadership, it is doubtful that any entity should be trusted to serve
as the sole regulator of its own conduct with respect to toxic and radioactive materials.
DOE's self-regulation is particularly alarming given the inherently dangerous character of
the materials subject to the AEA. See Panel Weighs External Regulation to Ensure Safety at DOE
Facilities, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Apr. 18, 1995, at A-2 (reporting DOE officials' acknowl-
edgements of the need for increased independent oversight).
140. The 91st Congress enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
604, which began the modem era of environmental cooperative federalism. See supra note
60 and accompanying text
141. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
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